Text obtained by optical character recognition (OCR) of the original scan, layout preserved. Automatic recognition — errors remain, especially on degraded faxes. The scan above is authoritative.
This assignment report
was produced by the company S E.P T.
Under the responsibility of
M Alain HUSSON DUMOUTIER
Ecole Supérieure de Commerce,
Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris
Member of the Chambre Nationale des Conseils et
Experts Financiers.
Arbitrator and Expert at the International
Chamber of Commerce
Former Head of Franchising at CREDIT
LYONNAIS
Former Court-Appointed Expert in finance and management
SELI
Kupport de mission - MeDONALD'S contre M COLORAFI - Mars 109k
Introduction
We were asked by the company McDONALD'S FRANCE and by Monsieur le Bâtonnier
LELOUP, on Friday 13 February 1998, to respond to the various points set out in the
report of Monsieur GANDUR dated 4 February 1998
Monsieur Mathieu LIS, a collaborator of S.E.P.T, went on site to ANTIBES on Thursday
19 February 1998 - Monsieur HUSSON DUMOUTIER on Wednesday 4 March
Reading Monsieur GANDUR's report and the arguments put forward led us to
extend our assignment on two fronts. First a technical front aimed not
only at responding to certain arguments which seemed open to discussion, but also at
presenting a more appropriate version of the facts
Then, a more doctrinal front which aims to explain the economics of the company McDONALD'S
and its constant adaptation to the fluctuations and deep changes in markets
This report will accordingly examine three points in turn:
- The analysis and refutation of certain elements of Monsieur GANDUR's report, both
as to form and as to substance
- The economics of McDONALD'S franchising and its characteristics
- The particular case of the companies controlled and managed by Monsieur COLLORAFI
in the general and local economic context
A methodical piece of work, based on these various elements, aims to present a second version of the
facts
SEPT. Rapport de mission - MADONALD'S contre M. COLLORAFI. Mars 109g
History
S August Lease-management of the McDONALD'S restaurant of ANTIBES to
M. COLLORAFI by MCDONALD'S FRANCE
Term 20 years
31 August Transfer of the agreement to the Company SEBOL
1g:me franchise
45ee McDONALD'S
14 December McDONALD'S loan agreement to Company SEBOL
¡ of 415,283.33 FF from 1 November 1988
Term 13 months
1° January McDONALD'S loan to SEBOL of 415,283.33 FF
Term 6 months
15 April| Loan agreement of 336.417.+1 F
Term 12 months
Regularised in October
Extension of the CARREFOUR Shopping Centre
(letter of 8 February 96 from COLLORAFI to Thierry CHERPITEL
ii
SEPT.
Rappori de misson - MCDONALD'S conre M. COLLORAF - Mars 1008
mars) MD CONSULTANTS study for the siting of a McDONALD'S
restaurant in ANTIBES
(Antibes Ouest, Les Pins)
July| Opening of the QUICK DRIVE
February| Flash study on Antibes
Nord (B & 0)
Ret D
8 February Letter from M. COLLORAFI to McDONALD'S
turnover falling since 94 + closing hours 21 h
QUICK impact 10 to 15%
* Cannes 5 to 10%
17 April Letter from M. COLLORAFI to Guy DUPUY at Aix
Turnover forecast 17 M.F. for SEBOL
31 July Creation of the company B & O operating Antibes Nord
9 October Opening of the McDONALD'S DRIVE at Antibes Nord
Let lease-management agreement known as “STRAIGHT LICENSE”
i.
SEPT . Rapport de mission • MeDONALD S contre M. COLLORAFI. Mars 1498
10 January Letter from M. COLLORAFI to M HENNEQUIN requesting the
Antibes Ouest - Vallauris restaurants
22 January
Meeting of VI COLLORAFI with Isabelle KUSTER
31 January| Letter from M. COLLORAFL He thanks for the acceptance of Antibes
Ouest
Regrets Vallauris awarded to M. GILARSKI
11 February| Creation of the articles of association of the company LESPINS
L au t avri!! Customer survey Antibes Centre Commercial CARREFOUR
Study cited by M GANDUR
29 April Opening of the McDONALD'S Les Pins restaurant
+ MeDONALD'S Vallauris
10 June Amendment of the Antibes Vord fees
Standard fee rate from 20% to 17%
Minimum monthly standard fee from 245,000 to 180,000 F
18 June Franchise agreement for Antibes Ouest (Les Pins). Type “B.F.L”
26 June| Summons of MCDONALD'S by M. COLLORAFI before the Commercial
Court of Paris
") a 11 September| 120-day review of Antibes les Pins
17 November Financial review of McDONALD'S
end of November Formal notices from McDONALD'S
Fees due
• LESPINS Oct., Nov. and Dec. 97
• B dO: March, April, June, Oct, Nov. 97 and Jan. 98
• SEBOL. 10 monthly instalments due Jan., Feb., March, April, May, June, July,
Oct., Nov. and Dec. 97
2 January | Termination of the 3 agreements by McDONALD'S FRANCE
NAP Rappor de riston . MEDONALD Sicare M COLLORAFI - Mars 1998
J
1st Part
Study and refutation of the arguments
put forward in the assignment
report of Monsieur GANDUR
Without calling into question the importance of the work carried out by M. GANDUR, our study will deal
first with the formal aspects of the study and then concentrate on the problems of
substance
ON FORM
Imprecisions
On several occasions the expert M. GANDUR uses the words “I estimate” to
give a quantitative assessment of a precise figure.
Thus on p. 22 of his report “he estimates at 1% of turnover the impact of the
cleaning of the premises carried out by in-house staff whereas it was previously provided
by an outside company”. This estimate does not give rise to a precise
calculation or a justification whereas this cost logically requires an
explanation.
The economy of scale consequently reaches only 1% according to this estimate. It would still
be necessary to know the financial approach that makes it possible to arrive at this result
Calculations
Likewise, certain calculations rounded by the expert M. GANDUR lead to
significant distortions in the assessment of the facts.
Thus several points can be analysed.
SEPT
• Rappori de mission • MeDONALDS contre M. COLLORAFI - iVars 1908
1.1.2.1. The aggregates used
The aggregation of the figures of the Var département with those of the Alpes-Maritimes
is not justified in the demonstration presented by the report
Indeed, the Var borders the Alpes-Maritimes but it is in no way
comparable, neither
by its economic situation nor by its population. This is why
MCDONALD'S distinguishes this département from that of the Alpes-Maritimes very
precisely in its statistics.
Moreover,
the western boundary of the Alpes-Maritimes lies beyond
Mandelieu and Théoule at the level of the col de la Cadière Miramar, i.e. more than
10 km from Cannes going towards Saint-Raphaël. Lastly no McDONALD'S
restaurant straddles the two départements.
After analysis, the joining of the statistics concerning the Alpes-Maritimes with
those of the Var introduces certain distortions that serve the demonstration of M. GANDUR's
report
Indeed, by using the cumulated figures of the Var and the Alpes-Maritimes the report
brings out several points (p. 6 of M. GANDLR's report):
The growth in turnover in percentage of the McDONALD'S restaurants located in
the Alpes-Maritimes and the Var is therefore
114.81%
+ 7,68%
+ 5,58%6
+ 15,60%
in 1994
in 1995
in 1996
in 1997
compared with 1993
compared with 1994
compared with 1995
compared with 1996
Whereas the figures relating only to the Alpes-Maritimes give the following
proportions (according to the same figures cited by M GANDUR p. 6):
+ 22,4 %»
+ 11,2%
- 7.3%%
19,4%%
in 1994
in 1995
in 1996
en 1447
compared with 1993
compared with 1994
compared with 1995
compared with 1996
The rate of expansion in the Alpes-Maritimes in 1997 of 4.4% for McDONALD'S
is therefore well below the 15.0% obtained by M. GANDUR for the Alpes-
Maritimes and the Var.
Rapport de menton deDONALD'S contre 11 COLLORARI Murs 1908
All of M. GANDUR's comparative calculations, notably for the bases that he
cites on p. 19, are affected when this coefficient of 1.011 is used to record
the increase in the turnover of the restaurants of the Var and the Alpes-Maritimes in
1997. Such a figure, very different from those that should have been used, calls into question
the subsequent calculations of the report
1.1.2.2. The elements of the aggregates with corrections
To get closer to reality we redid the calculations using the documents
made available to us in order to give a clearer approach to the elements
concerning the restaurants of the Alpes-Maritimes
For example, our table includes all the McDONALD'S restaurants of the
Alpes-Maritimes without those of the Var for the reasons given
above. Moreover, the PUGET restaurant is removed from the Alpes-Maritimes
compared with M. GANDUR's table. It is located in the Var, and not in the
Alpes-Maritimes where M. GANDUR had placed it in his annex no. 1
M. COLLORAFI's restaurants are included in this table, unlike M GANDUR's
table. It is indeed difficult to study a market without taking into
account all the McDONALD'S restaurants of that market. Nevertheless, in
the interest of accuracy, our totals show a
distinction between all of the Alpes-Maritimes and the same set without
M. COLLORAFI's restaurants
- i
SEPT
Rapport de mission - LEDONALD'S contre 1. COLLORALi • vars 1994
EE.L:
i.._
Change in annual turnover in francs of the McDONALD'S restaurants of the Alpes-Maritimes between 1992 and 1997
Site
Site Description
Opened
¿lisera en
Firale-
tron
1luteil
aracil 44
(usert en
17 NICE MASSENA
to ANTIBES
120 NICE LINCONTRE
102 MANDEDE
1St NICAPROMENALE
255 MONACTI
263 NICE TNL
296. CRASSE
331| CAGNES SUR MER
708 CAGNES PLAGES
437 CANNESTISALLEE
177 NICE SAN 4
184 MENION
5R ANTIBESNORD
501 ANTIDES EST
593 VALADRIS
612 MOOOINS
63 FANNISLANORTS
Total McDo. “comparable”
Sub-total without M. Colluan
Average McDo. “comparable”
Average without M. Colorad
Total All McDonald's
Sub-total without M. Colloral
Laren
ah ant 42
27422 021:2i
2257+212
2tr 820835
iK01572
23 150: 20 2
5KK7
1"+151.7k
21.07 $1
-5.37%
1 50%
18 (EN 571)
20 236 03-4
20$95 741
229Z5058
2÷249 0J0
?135168
76100940 15990868, 30 7086l9
30:C004 1339428H:
S0708619
207 328300|
178 080420 | 27384 178
152 008 160
22 157 I+i
D08:
-K119
+ 79%
175%
4,94%
0,204%
¡lurer
d'usert en
IX309795
20÷07 531
22 U6b 501
21 322#53
Terti 5602
73X8837
199277082 45 300552
Foula-
.!I.
25 7C'3
13.40%
- 17,039,
",23%
0.25%
10.74%
230 712 438
20 0014;
0814: 20108021
222 X83 942
6,01%
Source: McDonald's France, February 1998
"Open "
Li 880 H2
Evolu-
lion
* 774
30, 095
-D170
-+ 724
-0.57%
1.79%
0,91%.
-+ 385
| 49%
+775 inx.
+7 287211
17.385 olt.
3B80H
20381 KM
0,58%
3.85%
14.95%
1.1.2.3. Comments on the table - Change in annual turnover in FF of the
McDONALD'S restaurants of the Alpes-Maritimes
For each year, we drew up three columns (except in 1993, only two
columns):
• The first column “Opened before 19.” contains the turnover of the
McDONALD'S of the Alpes-Maritimes that had been open for at least one year at
1 January of the year in question: they have at least one full financial year (12 months)
before that year. These are the so-called “comparable” restaurants
• The second column “Opened in
/..” contains the turnover of the
McDONALD'S of the Alpes-Maritimes opened in the year in question or the previous
year; they have not completed at least two full financial years of 12 months
since their creation, the year in question included.
• The third and last column “Change” contains the percentages
of change in the turnover of the McDONALD'S of the Alpes-Maritimes
said to be “comparable”, the only ones to have at least one full financial year before the year
in question. This change quantifies the growth or decline in turnover
in the year in question compared with the previous year, which is also
full (12 months of activity).
On these turnover figures, three types of calculation were carried out (Note: each
of these three calculations was made, on the one hand, for all the McDONALD'S of the
Alpes-Maritimes, including M. COLLORAFI's restaurants, and, on the other hand,
for this set without M. COLLORAFI's restaurants)
• The first comprises the totals of the turnover of the “comparable” and newly
opened McDONALD'S (for less than two years).
• The second calculates the average turnover of the “comparable” MDONALD'S,
which have already had at least two full financial years. On this
average, we calculated the percentage change of this average
turnover
Note: Contrary to the method used by M. GANDUR, who took the
average of the percentage changes, which leads to a mathematical error,
we weight this change according to the turnover of each
McDONALD'S using as a base the average turnover. Indeed,
the average of the percentages cannot serve as a reliable base because it does not reflect
the importance in terms of turnover of the restaurants: for example, a
change of +10% for a restaurant with turnover of 15,000,000 F
corresponds to growth of 1,500,000 F whereas for a restaurant whose
turnover is 25,000,000 F it is 2,500,000 F, this is not reflected
in the average of the percentages. There is a difference of nearly 1,000,000 F. The
method that we used takes this difference into account.
Atil
SArT
Ruppori de mission - MCDONALD'S conde M COLLORAF! Mars 1008
• the third calculation is the total turnover of all restaurants,
“comparable” or not, with their change. Its purpose is to show
the constant change in McDONALD'S turnover in the Alpes-
Maritimes
Thus, by observing the more exact data, the figures for the average activity of the
restaurants of comparable type, quite
significant differences can be found with M. GANDUR's report.
If there is general agreement on the turnover of M. COLLORAFI's Antibes Centre
Commercial - the distortions are therefore significant on the averages that serve
afterwards as a reference for M. GANDUR in his calculations.
M. GANDUR's report sets out on p. 5 of his report the following changes
• Between 1993 and 1994
for the average of the restaurants
- 0,63%% for M. GANDUR
whereas our calculations result in - 5.02% with Antibes SEBOL.
- 5,22% without Antibes SEBOL
Compared with 1993, there is therefore not stagnation in 1994 but a decline
• Between 1994 and 1995, the difference is even more marked:
for the average of the restaurants
+ 5.11% for M. GANDUR
whereas our calculations result in - 1.10% with Antibes SEBOL
and
• 0.81% without Antibes SEBOL
Which amounts to o points of difference between our references, that is to say that there is
near-stagnation in 1995 and not growth
• Between 1995 and 1996, the gaps are 2.45 points:
for the average of the restaurants
- 9,34% for M. GANDUR
whereas our calculations result in
- 11,79%o with Antibes SEBOL
- 9,98% without Antibes SEBOL
SEPT
• Rapport de mission
MADONALD S'contre M COLLORAFI. Mari 1998
i."
Statistics of McDonald's restaurants
located in the Alpes-Maritimes
Number of restaurants
All restaurants
“Comparable” restaurants
Turnover (millions of FF)
All restaurants
Growth in turnover
All restaurants
of “comparable” restaurants
Turnover per restaurant
All restaurants
- “Comparable” restaurants
Source: McDonald's France, February 1998
2X8
10,74%
-5,027 |
9,547
-1,10%
-11,747
17,06
0,587
20,974
24.052 |
22,844| 22,592 19,928| 20,043
Comments
This table takes account of the table on page 6 of M. GANDUR's report
Again, the differences in the number of restaurants lie in the fact
that M. GANDUR does not count M. COLLORAFI's restaurants (one
additional between 1993 and 1995, two additional in 1996 and three
additional in 1997)
It can already be observed that the so-called comparable restaurants reach
after 1993 a plateau of 20 M F in general which is relatively stable with + or -
10% variation. When this figure is exceeded, it is an accident (the Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy crisis for example)
DISCUSSION ON SUBSTANCE
The calculations relating to the term of the agreement for the Antibes Ouest -
Les Pins restaurant operated by the company LES PINS
M. COLLORAFI insisted very strongly in order to obtain the concessions for the restaurants
of Antibes Ouest and Vallauris.
NANE - Rappor de mission - VEDONALD'S conte M. COLLORAF? - Mars 1498
there are numerous traces of this - letter of 10 January 1997 from M. COLLORAFI to
M HENNEQUIN, meeting of M. COLLORAFI with Mme Isabelle KUSTER on
16 December 1996 and 22 January 1997 and finally letter of 31 January 1997 from
M COLLORAFI to McDONALD'S thanking for the award of the restaurant
of Antibes Ouest and regretting that that of Vallauris was awarded to M. GILARSKI.
On 11 February 1997 the articles of association of the company LES PINS were filed
On 29 April 1997, 2 and a half months later, the McDOVALD'S DRIVE restaurant
of Les Pins opens. However the agreement, which had originally been planned as a
“straight” type agreement with MCDONALD'S, became, owing to the
financing problems of M COLLORAFI, a “B.FL.” type agreement.* This agreement was signed
subsequently on 18 June 1997.
But all the financial investments had been made beforehand, before the opening
However, they had not yet all been paid.
That is to say that McDONALD'S would have had to invest, under its so-called
“straight” agreement, 9,282,000 F and its franchisee 2,543,000 F
But the franchisee turned to his franchisor and asked it to bear the share that fell to him.
The agreement was therefore signed as “B.F.L” type (Business Facility License) for a term
of 3 years and MCDONALD'S bears an additional 2,543,000 F'
Thus, ultimately, the franchisee COLLORAFI financed 378,000 F, i.e. 3.1% of the
amount of the investments of this restaurant, which total 12,203,000 FF, and
the franchisor McDONALD'S 11,825,000 FF, i.e. 96.4%
(Sources: McDONALD'S. see annex 1.1)
In this regard, the proximity of the dates is quite telling since the franchise agreement of Les Pins was amended on 18 June 1997 in favour of M. COLLORAFI and on
26 June 1997, that is 8 days later exactly, the franchisee sent
the writ of summons to his franchisor claiming 45.350 M F. in compensation. One might
as well say that the writ of summons was ready on the day the said agreement was signed
"Let us recall that this type of “B.F L” agreement is generally intended for beginner franchisees with
little capital - which was not the case of M. COLLORAFI
NEPT Rapport de misson
HEDONALDS ronde M COLLORAT. Mars 100g
Be that as it may, the agreement for the Les Pins restaurant is terminated since, following
the procedure provided for in the lease-management agreement, the franchisor sent on
27 November 1997 a formal notice to pay the fees and on the date
of 2 January 1998 the agreement was terminated in accordance with the stipulations which provide
that the agreement is terminated if a single payment of fees is not honoured (article
ID. Now the company LES PINS already owed at 31 December 1997 the amount of
3 fees, namely for the months of October, November and December 1997, for a
total of 504,474.42 FF (see annex 1.2)
Moreover, the option that was reserved to the franchisee until 31.13.1997 to
convert this “B.EL” agreement into a “straight license” had lapsed by the very fact
that this franchisee had not honoured the provisions of his amended agreement
Consequently it is not possible for the expert M. GANDUR to use as the number
of years remaining to run until the normal term of the lease-management agreement of the
company LES PINS a period of 19.35 years on the pretext that the extension of the
agreement is at the sole initiative of the lessee-manager. An agreement can be extended only
if it is still in force. Now it happens that this agreement is terminated by the
franchisee's own breaches
Consequently the normal expiry of this agreement, if the termination is not pronounced
before, is on 28 April 2000 and not on 28 April 2017, although, if one
refers to the signing of the agreement of 18 June 1997, the expiry date would be 18 June
2000 - i.e. a remainder of 39 months.
On the reasoning of the capitalisation of losses
The present report shows in detail in the third part that the impact of
the opening of a McDONALD'S restaurant on others already existing has a
relatively limited duration. It is reduced and temporary, if only because of the
development of the market.
In other words, if it is sometimes noted that the impact of a new restaurant on
a previously established restaurant leads the latter to suffer a certain decrease
in turnover compared with the forecasts, and sometimes, even more rarely, to
losses, these are, over time, very quickly absorbed by the resumption of the
development of the two restaurants concerned. We give the details on this
observation in the 3rd part
M. GANDUR's report, being based on an extreme and questionable hypothesis,
estimates that these losses, depending on the restaurants, are lasting and permanent over 9 years,
even 18 years and 19 years
S LIE: - Kapport de russion - VODONALD 5 conte 11 COLLORAFI. Mars J409
Thus for SEBOL (p. 35 of the report) M. GANDUR estimates the loss of
margin on variable costs at 1,415,000 F which he extends over a period of 9.58 years
With the discounting adopted of 6.9757077 the amount of the loss reaches 9,576,354 FF
This same reasoning (p. 35) leads M. GANDUR to estimate the gap in gross self-financing
margin of B & O at 2,239,000 F per year, extended over 18.75 years
With the discounting of 9.97 the estimated loss reaches 22,198,563 FF
Lastly for the LES PINS restaurant (p. 35), the gap in gross self-financing margin
is 1,318,000 F extended this time over 19.33 years (we saw in 1.2.1
why this period could not be used) The calculation results in a loss for
this third restaurant of 13,244,734 F with a discounting coefficient of 10.203
In total, by capitalising the losses in this way, the report arrives, most
conveniently, at the sum of 45,019,651 F.
Now it is more or less this sum that is claimed by M COLLORAFI in his
writ of summons dated 26 June 1997, i.e. 7 months before M. GANDUR's report,
but on totally different grounds. Indeed M COLLORAFI asks
for compensation of
i.e. in total
30,000,000 FF for the company SEBOT.
5,000,000 FF for the company B & O
and 10,350,000 FF for himself
+5 350 000 FF
The expert notes in this regard that there is no loss for M COLLORAFI
personally
On the calculation of the fees
1.2.3.1. According to M. GANDUR's report
M GANDLR, taking the forecast results of the 3 restaurants according to the
modifications he makes to them, determines the rents and fees that can be borne by
the said restaurants
Thus the fees become, p. 30 of the report
for SEBOL
for B & 0
for LES PINS
736,000 F
1,172,000 F
1,034,000 F
i.e. 61,333 FF per month
i.e. 97,667 FF per month
i.e. 86,167 FF per month
SEPT Rapport de musion - MCDONALD'S conte N COLLORA// - Mars 1998
But with such an amount of fees the results of the companies would still be
negative.
SEBOL would lose
B & O would lose
LESPINS would lose
484,000 F
240,000 F
100,000 F
Continuing the calculations leads the report to estimate the amount of fees for
a zero result, i.e. the level of the break-even point, at
252,000 F annually for SEBOL i.e.
794,000 F annually for B & O i.e.
934,000 F annually for LES PINS i.e.
21,000 F per month
66,167 F per month
77,834 F per month
Such values, so far removed from the current figures and from those generally charged
by McDONALD'S restaurants, are not enough to pay the
repayments of the loans taken out by McDONALD'S to finance the
fixed assets operated by M. COLLORAFI.
Thus, for the Antibes Centre Commercial restaurant, considering only the
simple rents and without taking into account the works financed by McDONALD'S, the
information obtained from McDONALD'S gives the following elements -
for a surface area of 402 m² including 62 m² of terrace, a restaurant room of
244 m² on the ground floor and 97 m² of kitchen and technical premises, with on the 1st floor, a
crew room and a technical room -
the current indexed rent is
i.e.
162,630 F per year
38,553 F per month
But the lease must be renewed and the request made by the landlord is
093,000 F per year for the rent alone, i.e. 57,750 F per month.
Let us add lastly that the leasehold right, at the acquisition of the business in 1987, reached
2,740,000 F
Thus, assuming that SEBOL pays 21,000 F of fees per month to
MCDONALD'S, the amount of this payment would not even cover 54.5% of the rent
paid by McDONALD'S to the landlord
VEZI . Rapport de mission - MCDONALD S conte M. COLLURAFI - Mars 1948
1.2.3.2. New presentation of the fee calculations with discussion
An adversarial study of the fees was drawn up to present an
economically more acceptable version.
We studied in turn the cases of
- Antibes Centre Commercial - operated by the company SEBOL,
- Antibes Les Pins - operated by the company LES PINS.
- Antibes Ouest - operated by the company B & O (this case, being the most complex and the
most delicate, was added at the end).
At each stage we compared the figures used by the expert M GANDUR and
those presented by the company McDONALD'S, giving an explanation of the
distortions observed
SART
Rapport de mission - MEDONALD'S contre M. COLORAFI
. Hari 1008
Table determining the bearable fee paid to McDONALD'S by the
company SA SEBOL
SA SEBOL
Type of building Mall
Sales
of which food sales
Total cost of food purchases
Packaging
Total cost of food products sold
Gross margin on food sales
Crew labour
Salaries of managers and social charges
Travel expenses
Advertising 6M
Local promotion
External services
Uniforms
Operating supplies
Equipment maintenance and repairs
Electricity, water, gas, telephone
Office supplies
Cash shortages
Total controllable expenses
Profit after controllable expenses
, Standard fee
Equipment fee
Service fee
Accounting and legal fees
Insurance
Taxes and permits
Depreciation and amortisation
Financial charges
Total non-
controllable expenses
Non-food sales
Total non-food
Net non-food result
Net operating result (S.0.1)
Salary of lessee-manager
Other expenses
Office expenses
Total administration costs
Net result before tax
Gross self-financing margin
Loan repayment
Financially bearable rent
McDonald's
101.20%
10,00
32,63%
16,1202
M. Gandur
r7 of sales
food
101.20%
10119L
25,39;.
≥ 970
29,350
7 149 70,65%
300,750
1,38%
+501
0,24
3:49%
0.30%%
0.79%
3.50%
3,32%
012%
i.120:
11,301%
$ 322
11,71%
27.94%
1 X00
1.73%;
3,31°c
6,139%
1.20%
33,83%
1,370)
- D, 1750
- 1,37%
5.000i
3,76%
- 5,14%
17,11%
3 858|
11,83%
1.72%
38,13%
-0, 19%
•1 050-10.38%
1127%
4,92%
-1 548-15.30%
XCa1)
X5%
7,27%
Gap
hit
1 147)
¡ 175
SEPT Rapport de mession
MCDONALD'S conte 4 COLLORAFI-Mars 1998
Comments:
The purpose of this table is to determine the fee that can be borne by SA SEBOL
According to M. GANDUR, page 30 of his report, “The level of rents and base fees
presumed ‘bearable’ is that which would make it possible to achieve, after
repayment of the loan instalments in principal, a zero gross self-financing margin, that is to say without worsening the financial situation.”
We studied in the same way as M GANDUR the forecast result for
1998, noting nevertheless some differences between the indications of
McDONALD'S and those of M. GANDUR. Our calculations take account of the
elements of the P.A.C (Source: McDONALD'S) which we took into account.
The 1998 turnover used by M. GANDUR is 10,240,000 F, a figure
that we dispute. We used a figure of 11,300,000 F which is
intermediate between M GANDUR's figure (10,240,000 F) and the turnover
achieved in 1997 by the restaurant, i.e. 11,654,691 F (see comments on the next page)
The table is divided into three main parts:
• The first contains the figures recorded for all the
McDONALD'S restaurants, i.e. the amount of each item in kF and the percentage of this
amount in relation to the turnover from food sales.
• The second takes up the figures given by M. GANDUR: here again one finds
an amount in kF and a percentage of the turnover from
food sales
• The third column is intended to specify the differences between our calculations and
those of M. GANDUR.
Variances:
The sources used to determine the fee come from the report of
M GANDUR, whose pages we cite, and from McDONALD'S
M. GANDUR's report, page 31, arrives at an acceptable fee of
736,000 F for 1998, and
our calculations arrive at a higher fee
(+ 1,175,000 F) of
1,911,000 F. The fee contractually due to
MCDONALD'S (1,800,000 F) is therefore bearable because it is lower than this figure
”. i
SEPT
Kapport de mission
HEDONALD'S contre M. COLLORAFT . Wars 1448
This difference lies in the following differences of assessment
• The turnover that we calculated is 11,300,000 F and that of
M. GANDUR 10,240,000 F, i.e. a difference of 1,060,000 F. To
calculate this turnover, we used M GANDUR's report
M. GANDUR, pages 19 and 20 of his report, assesses at -2.03% the impact of
the opening of the Antibes Nord, Antibes Ouest and Vallauris restaurants on
the Antibes restaurant (SA SEBOL). The last opening date of a
restaurant is 28 April 1997, so the Antibes restaurant will be “impacted”,
as is shown in the 3rd part, until April 1998 (12 months). From May
1998, it will return to its actual level of 1997.
We therefore obtain turnover of 11,312,585 F, rounded to 11,300,000 F
as the following table shows:
SA SEBOL
Actual
January
908 249,
February
March
April
Total Jan./April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
1 025 +11
Total May/Dec.
Total forecast 1998
Source: Report of Monsieur GANDU R
Impact |
Forecast!
9,039
9,03 *
9,03.
X26 231
X47016
X50050
3 +46 462
X2X 277
• The amount of food sales, which serves as the basis for calculating the fees
to be paid to McDONALD'S, is calculated with the same percentage of total
turnover given by M. GANDUR in his report (page 31). This
explains the difference at the level of the amounts but not at the level
of the
percentages
• Rapport de misson - M DONALD Scontre M. COLORAT - Mars 1998
. d
• The third difference is found in the amount of the P.A.C* (Profit After
Controllable expenses). It is much higher (+ 817,000 F) in
McDONALD'S's indications. These are calculated from a linear
regression line with the equation
P.A.C. = Food sales turnover x 0.4096 - 430,000 F
This equation is calculated by a regression analysis of the P.A.C of
all the McDONALD'S in France from the income statements
provided by the lessee-managers at 31/12/96 over the last 12 months.
That is why we do not detail it (see annex no. 3 for
details).
The P.A.C. is determined for each type of building “Mall” (in a
shopping centre), or “Free-Stander” (stand-alone building). Here, the
Antibes restaurant is a “Mall”, so the equation of the regression line of
all the “Mall” type restaurants was used. This equation was
sent in June 1997, as to all the other franchisees, to
M COLLORAFI, who did not dispute it
• A fourth difference appears in the amount of non-controllable expenses: the Antibes restaurant generates 80,000 F more in this type of
expenses than McDONALD'S's indications. This excess lies in
only two items: “Service fee” and “Accounting and
legal fees”: for all the other items, the figures given by M. GANDUR
in his report were kept. For the first item (Service fee),
the difference is normal because it depends on the turnover, which is
higher in our calculations. Moreover, M. GANDUR's calculation is not
made on the turnover from food sales as is done in
reality, but on total turnover, which causes a slight gap of
0.06% of food sales. The second item (Accounting and legal fees)
is greatly inflated for 1998 at 216,000 F whereas since 1993,
according to the income statements of the company SA SEBOL, it stood at around
95,000 F per year. This sharp increase must be linked to the writ of summons of
M. COLLORAFI against McDONALD'S. The average of this item
for all McDONALD'S lessee-managers in France is
around 90,000 F; it is this latter figure that was taken into account
• For the non-food result, the figure given by M. GANDUR was
kept, even if the amount of non-food sales is higher
(113,000 F) because it depends on the turnover from food sales
(here 1.20%)
.. i
ii
The PAC is also a management indicator of the McDONALD'S system. It reflects the quality of the management of a
restaurant. It takes into account all the expenses over which the management team may have an
influence. Items over which this team has no means of action are not taken into account: non-controllable expenses
(fees, depreciation, financial charges).
'RPT
Rappors de mission MCDONALD'S contre M. COLORAF! Mars 190g
• The preceding differences lead to a very different net operating result
different: - 1,050,000 F for M. GANDUR and - 153,000 F in our calculations,
i.e. a difference of 897,000 F
• Another difference appears at the level of administration costs: the amount
given by M GANDUR is 498,000 F. As this is an item that includes the
remuneration of the lessee-manager, its amount depends solely on the decision
of the head of the business. As in every business, sound management must
lead to adapting administration costs to the company's capacity. We
for our part approximately took up the figure appearing in M GANDUR's calculations
for the LESPINS restaurant, i.e. 420,000 F
• The gross self-financing margin corresponds to the net result before tax
to which is added the amount of depreciation and amortisation made
during the financial year
• Lastly, M. GANDUR's report indicates a loan repayment of
200,000 F for 1998. We note that this loan of 350,000 F was
taken out with Crédit du Nord on 28 January 1997 (see annex 3.3). MCDONALD'S
told us that in parallel with the taking out of this loan,
M. COLLORAFI had himself reimbursed the same sum by the company
SA SEBOL. Moreover M COLLORAFI paid himself 1,000,000 F of
dividends in respect of the profits of the previous financial year. For these various reasons,
it seemed to us that this loan was not justified and we did not
take it into account as an expense.
Be that as it may, according to the repayment schedule, the monthly instalment is 10,549.90 F, i.e.
126,598.80 F for the year 1998, and not 200,000 F as indicated by
M GANDUR
All these elements explain the difference (+ 1,175,000 F) between the amount of the
bearable fee presented here and that of M GANDUR's report
The amount of rent financially bearable by the lessee-manager is therefore
1,911,000 F, i.e. 111,000 F more than the rent currently paid by the company
SA SEBOL. It is important to stress that the forecast turnover used
(11,300,000 F) is low; it will rise again 12 months after the impact of all the
new restaurants, i.e. from 29 April 1998 (see 3rd part)
SEPT
Rappori de mission - MEDONALD'S conre 11. COLLORAFI - Mars 1994
Table determining the bearable fee paid to McDONALD'S by the
company SARL LES PINS
SARL LES PINS
Type of building Free-Stander special
Sales
of which food sales
Total cost of food purchases
Packaging
Total cost of food products sold
Gross margin on food sales
Crew labour
Salaries of managers and social charges
Travel expenses
Advertising GLE
Local promotion
External services
Uniforms
Operating supplies
Equipment maintenance and repairs
Electricity, water, gas, telephone
Office supplies
Cash shortages
Total controllable expenses
Profit after controllable expenses
Standard fee
Equipment fee
Service fee
Accounting and legal fees
Insurance
Taxes and permits
Depreciation and amortisation
Financial charges
Rents
Total non-controllable expenses
Non-food sales
Total non-food
Net non-food result
Net operating result (s.0.i))
Lessee-manager's salary
Other expenses
Office expenses
Total administration costs
Net result before tax
Gross self-financing margin
Loan repayment
Financially bearable rent
McDonald's
rode rente
Imentaire
101,30%
10000%
+59
I(X)
32,24%
15,007
4,5091
5,00гc
0.98%
1,52%
1.00C
0,39C%
0,397
28,79%
1,305.
1,31%
- 0,01%
3.44%
4.57%%
- 1,13%
-014o
M. Gandur
r of sales
food
9 300 101,10%
9 181 |
= 1201
26,36'
3.05°i
29.41%
70.39%
12.870%
24!
3.706l
0,26%
+20
1.05%
2.48%
1,30C;.
1.82%
2-0)
201%
11.1.5%
+20
t65
0,336%
41.18%
29.41%
1519%
4.57%
5,06%
1,577
0,5291
Yut
091%
1,000°;
11.395%
11.30%
29,71%
1.309%
131%
-0.01%
- 29|
-0,32%
3, HVie.
0,20%
1.05%
+321
1.71%
- 5.02%
373'
14,96%
11,26%
S.E P.T. Rapport de mawon
MEDONALD'S conre M. COLLOKAFY Mars 1999
Gap
hf
Comments
The purpose of this table is to determine the fee that can be borne by SARL LES PINS
According to M. GANDUR, page 30 of his report, “The level of rents and base fees
presumed ‘bearable’ is that which would make it possible to achieve, after
repayment of the loan instalments in principal, a zero gross self-financing margin, that is to say without worsening the financial situation.”
We studied in the same way as M. GANDUR the forecast result for
1998 while
noting some differences between the indications of
McDONALD'S and those of M. GANDUR. Our calculations take account of the
elements of the P A.C (Source: McDONALD'S) which we took into account
The table is divided into three main parts:
• The first contains the figures recorded for all the
McDONALD'S restaurants, i.e. the amount of each item in kF and the percentage of this
amount in relation to the turnover from food sales.
• The second takes up the figures given by M. GANDLR, here again one finds
an amount in kF and a percentage of the turnover from food
sales.
• The third column is intended to specify the differences between our calculations and
those of M. GANDUR
Sources:
The sources used to determine the fee come from the report of
M GANDUR, whose pages we cite, and from McDONALD'S
M GANDUR's report, page 33, arrives at an acceptable fee of
1,034,000 F for 1998, and our calculations arrive at a higher fee
(+ 330,000 F), of 1,373,000 F. This amount, 4,000 F lower, is very close
(0.4%) to that requested by McDONALD'S from the company LESPINS
Rapport de mission - MODONALD'S conre M. COLLORAFT Mars lgyg
This difference lies in the following differences of assessment:
• Unlike the two other companies, SA SEBOL and SARL B & O,
we do not call into question the turnover estimated by M. GANDUR of
9,300,000 F. It is important to note that the restaurant has been open only since
28 April 1997, i.e. less than a year, and that it has not been “impacted” by any other
restaurant since that date except possibly by that of Vallauris, but the latter
opened on exactly the same day, i.e. 29 April 1997.
• The first difference is found in the amount of the P.A.C* (Profit After
Controllable expenses). It is higher (+ 200,000 F) in the indications
of McDONALD'S. These are calculated from a linear
regression line with the equation (see annex 1.3)
P A.C - Food sales turnover x 0.4163 - 862,000 F
Here, the Antibes Ouest restaurant is a “Free-Stander special” with a
drive-through service (drive). The equation of the regression line of all the
“Free-Stander” type restaurants was therefore used (see above
“Determination of the bearable fee by SA SEBOL” for details)
• A second difference appears in
the amount of non-controllable
expenses: the Antibes Ouest restaurant generates 85,000 F more in this
type of expenses than McDONALD'S's indications. This excess
lies in the first four items of the table: the various fees and
the “Accounting and legal fees”; for all the other items, the figures
given by M. GANDUR in his report were kept
For the Standard, equipment and service fees, the differences lie
in the fact that M. GANDUR's calculations are not made on the turnover
from food sales as is done in reality, but on total turnover, which causes a slight gap, between 0.19% and 0.06%, of
food sales depending on the fee.
The item “Accounting and legal fees” is inflated for 1998 at
144,000 F. This sharp increase must also be linked, as
previously, to
the writ of summons of M. COLLORAFI against
MCDONALD'S. The average of this item for all McDONALD'S lessee-managers
in France is around 90,000 F; it is this latter
figure that was taken into account.
NEPT. - Rapport de mission - UCDONALD'S conte M. COLLORAF! - Murs 1098
• It should be noted that in these controllable expenses, the amount of
depreciation and amortisation
is particularly low. This is due to the fact
that M. COLLORAFI for this restaurant benefited from a B.F.L., that is to say that
MCDONALD'S also financed the equipment of this restaurant (approximately
2,550,000 F) and that M COLLORAFI only needed to finance the small
equipment and the share capital of his company (a SARL, i.e. 50,000 F).
Nevertheless, to keep the restaurant, he would have to, had the agreement not been
terminated, buy back the equipment from McDONALD'S within three years, i.e. before
29 April 2000
• The preceding differences lead to a different net operating result:
- 29,000 F for M. GANDUR and - 316,000 F for our calculations, i.e.
a difference of 345,000 F
• Another difference of 12,000 F appears at the level of administration
costs: as for SA SEBOL, the amount used is
120,000 F
• The gross self-financing margin corresponds to the net result before tax
to which has been added the amount of depreciation and amortisation made during
the financial year. The result being modified in our calculations, the gross self-financing
margin is too.
All these elements explain the difference (+ 339,000 F) in the amount of the bearable fee
presented here compared with that of M GANDUR's report
The amount of rent financially bearable by the lessee-manager is therefore
1,375,000 F, i.e. 4,000 F less than the rent currently paid by the company
SARL LES PINS. But this restaurant is in the start-up phase (only 10 months of existence at
the end of February 1998); its turnover will normally be higher than
that estimated here by M. GANDUR
SER 1
•Kapport de massion • HEDONARD'S conte M. COLLORAFT - Mars 1944
Table determining the bearable fee paid to McDONALD'S by the
company SARL B & O
SARL B & 0
Type of building Free-Stander 100
Sales
of which food sales
Total cost of food purchases
Packaging
Total cost of food products sold
Gross margin on food sales
Crew labour
Travel expenses and social charges
McDonald's
M. Gandur
kl
Fo of sales
Ce of sales
food
food
101,50%
12 600 101,50%
100,007
12+14
100,00)*
25,86%
208%
28,84%
8 834| 71.16%
=050
21,354
7.54%3
0.19%
451%
0.87%%
3,20%
30)
30X
11,24%
0.64%
1.45%
2.t2)
Gap
118,
Local promotion
External services
Uniforms
Operating supplies
Electricity, water, gas, telephone
Office supplies
Cash shortages
Irien
Total controllable expenses
Profit after controllable expenses
Standard fee
Equipment fee
Service fee
Accounting and legal fees
34.74%
23,5042
$ 342
43,03%
з 492| 28,13%
23.08%
Taxes and permits
Depreciation and amortisation
Financial charges
Rents
Total non-controllable expenses
? Non-food sales
Total non-food
Net non-food result
Net operating result (S.O.D)
Lessee-manager's salary
Other expenses
Office expenses
Total administration costs
Net result before tax
Gross self-financing margin
Loan repayment
Financially bearable rent
(6)
0,180%
1,73F0
5.27%
1,539%
11,38%
$ 844
38,715
1x8
2f
1.29%
0,21%
- 3,77%6
+20
3,36%
-7,12%
- 1.85%
- 3.36%
18,29 %a
630!
1,35%
0.18%
1.74%
+ 926
39,68%
1,50%
1.24%
0.21%
408 - 11,34%
3,18%
020%
4,83%
- 2 008 - 16,18%
1.348|
• 10,80%
3,381%
2,44%
SEPT. Mapport de mission - MEDONALD'S conte M COLORAFI Mars 1 998
Comments
The purpose of this table is to determine the fee that can be borne by SARL B & O
According to M GANDUR, page 30 of his report, “The level of rents and base fees
presumed ‘bearable’ is that which would make it possible to achieve, after
repayment of the loan instalments in principal, a zero gross self-financing margin, that is to say without worsening the financial situation.”
We studied in the same way as M. GANDLR the forecast result for
1998 while noting some differences between the indications of
McDONALD'S and those of M. GANDUR. Our calculations take account of the
elements of the PA C (Source: McDONALD'S) which we took into account
The table is divided into three main parts
• The first contains the figures recorded for all the
McDONALD'S restaurants, i.e. the amount of each item in kF and the percentage of this
amount in relation to the turnover from food sales.
• The second takes up the figures given by M GANDLR: here again one finds
an amount in kF and a percentage of the turnover from food
sales
• The third column is intended to specify the differences between our calculations and
those of M. GANDUR
Sources:
The sources used to determine the fee come from the report of
M GANDUR, whose pages we cite, and from McDONALD'S
M. GANDUR's report, page 32, arrives at an acceptable fee of
1,172,000 F for 1998, and
our calculations arrive at a higher fee
(+ 1,117,000 F), of 2,289,000 F.
.i
*i
SEPr
• Rapport de meven
MEDONALD 'S ronde V COLLORAFI - Mars 149X
This difference lies in the following differences of assessment:
• The turnover that we defined is 12,700,000 F and that of
M GANDUR 12,600,000 F, i.e. a small difference of 100,000 F. To
calculate the turnover, we used the same method as that used by
M. GANDUR in his report
Page 28 of this report: M. GANDUR uses the seasonal coefficients calculated
for the company SA SEBOL from the financial years 1993 and 1994 (page 14 of
his report). Here, we simply added the turnover of the Antibes Nord restaurant for the month of January 1998: it was communicated to us by
McDONALD'S. The seasonal coefficient for the month of January is 7.22%. This
allows us to calculate the average of the annual trends with an additional data point, which refines the result
We therefore obtain an average turnover of 12,728,496 F, rounded to
12,700,000 F for turnover, as the following table shows:
SARL B & O
Actual
May 97
1 063 745|
June 07
July 97
soit 97
1 337.331,
¡Septemhre 97
October 9?
lorembre 97
December 17
January 98
1 036316|
Monthly
coeff.
7,817
10.64%
8,035.
8.82°%
7,77 c
8.77%
7,2307
Average calculated over 9 months
Sources: McDonald's and Report of Monsieur GANDUR
Annual
trend
12 728 496j
• The second difference is found in the amount of the PAC (Profit After
Controllable expenses). It is much higher (+ 855,000 F) in the
indications of McDONALD'S. These are calculated from a linear
regression line with the equation (see annex 1.3):
PAC = Food sales turnover x 0.4163 - 862,000 F
Here, the Antibes Nord restaurant is a “Free-Stander 100” with drive-through
service (drive). The equation of the regression line of all the
“Free-Stander” type restaurants was therefore used (see above
“determination of the bearable fee by SA SEBOL” for details)..
J
SENT
• Rapport de mission - MCDONALD'S contre M. COLLORAFI - Mars 1998
• A third difference appears in the amount of non-controllable
expenses: the Antibes Nord restaurant generates 82,000 F more in this
type of expenses than McDONALD'S's indications. This excess
lies in two items of the table: “Service fee” and “Accounting and
legal fees”; for all the other items, the figures given by
M. GANDUR in his report were kept.
For the “Service fee”, the difference lies in the fact that M. GANDUR's calculations
are not made on the turnover from food sales as is done in reality, but on total turnover, which
causes a slight gap of 0.07% of food sales, all the more so as the
turnover calculated here is slightly higher (+ 98,000 F for food
sales).
The item “Accounting and legal fees” is inflated for the year 1998 at
168,000 F. This sharp increase must be linked, as previously, to
the writ of summons of M. COLLORAFI against McDONALD'S. The average
of this item for all McDONALD'S lessee-managers in France
is around 90,000 F; it is this latter figure that was taken into account
• It should be noted that in these controllable expenses, the amount of the standard
fee is calculated from the minimum fee defined by the agreement; it
is 245,00D F per month, i.e. 2,940,000 F per year. The minimum fee is
used if the standard fee of 20% of food sales is lower than
this minimum. Nevertheless, it is necessary to recall here that in 1997 an
adjustment of the fee was
granted to M COLLORAFI by
McDONALD'S: the rate was brought down from 20% to 17%, and the minimum fee
from 245,000 F to 180,000 F per month, i.e. 2,160,000 F per year. This adjustment
was valid for the whole of 1997 with retroactive effect from
1 January 1997. However this adjustment was not valid for 1998, which
explains why the rate and the minimum fee used here are those of the
agreement.
• For the non-food result, the figure given by M. GANDUR was
kept, even if the amount of non-food sales is slightly
higher (+ 2,000 F) because it depends on the turnover from food sales
(here 1.50%).
• The preceding differences lead to a very different net operating result:
- 1,408,000 F for M GANDUR and - 471,000 F for our calculations,
i.e. a difference of 937,000 F
• Another difference of 180,000 F appears at the level of administration
costs: the amount given by M. GANDUR is 600,000 F.
As for the two other restaurants, we used the sum of
420,000 F.
NEPT Rapport de mission MeDONALDS conde A1. COLLORAFI 1urs 1998
• The gross self-financing margin corresponds to the net result before tax
to which has been added all the depreciation and amortisation made during
the financial year. The result being modified by our calculations, the gross self-financing margin
is too.
All these elements explain the difference (+ 1,117,000 F) in the amount of the
bearable fee presented here compared with that of M. GANDUR's report
The amount of rent financially bearable by the lessee-manager is therefore
2,289,000 F, i.e. 651,000 F less than the fee defined by the agreement but
120,000 F more than the adjustment of the fee granted by McDONALD'S in
1997 to the company SARL B & O.
Remarks
Having reached the end of this study of the three companies, it is important to note that
the totality of the remuneration provided for M. COLLOFARI in the calculations of
M GANDUR's report comes to the following figures:
SA SEBOL
SARL LESPIS
SARL B & O
360,000 F
312,000 F
432,000 F
Total
1,101,000 F
These figures are to be compared with the negative results forecast in the same report
for these three companies.
Conclusions
The new presentation of the fee calculations with discussion arrives at figures
different from those of M GANDUR's report. Consequently, they therefore call into question
its conclusions.
They demonstrate a posteriori that the level of fees applied in 1997
was bearable for the three restaurants, taking into account for SARL B & O the
adjustment that had been granted to it.
Be that as it may, the calculations on which we have focused cannot be
applied insofar as the agreements have been terminated since 2 January 1998.
and
AEP.T.. Rappori de massion
VIDONALD'S contre M. COLLORAFI - Mars 1998
2nd Part
McDONALD'S's success rests on
the success of the franchisees
THE CONDITIONS OF McDONALD'S's SUCCESS
Created in 1955 in Des Plaines, Illinois by M. KROC, the McDONALD'S network
has become, in 43 years, a major international company. It achieves under its
brand turnover of approximately 34,000 M$. The network comprises 23,33
restaurants in 109 countries, which places it in the leading position, far ahead of all its
competitors.
The McDONALD'S brand is the benchmark of fast food, which has become
synonymous with a lifestyle that is young, active and dynamic
McDONALD'S's success is particularly remarkable in France: between 1987
and 1997 its turnover rose from 657 M.F. to 8,388 M.F. McDONALD'S's market share
in 1987 was 30% against 70% for its competitors; ten years
later the market shares have reversed, 70% for McDONALD'S, 30% for
its competitors, in a market that grew from 1 to 11 billion francs. In other
words, its competitors have grown since their share has reached 3.3 billion
FF, but McDONALD'S even more so
The development of this new market is partly due to exogenous reasons, linked to
changes in lifestyles, but it is also explained by McDONALD'S's advertising and
marketing effort as well as by the particularities of its restaurants. By the
admission of its main competitor QUICK, these particularities helped
to acclimatise the fast-food concept among the French.
A franchise founded on partnership
McDONALD'S now has only one concern: not to rest on forty
years of success and to let the entrepreneurial spirit of the pioneers dissolve in the
complexity of a multinational.
To avoid this pitfall which lies in wait for all large companies, McDONALD'S uses
a particular development policy: franchising, which brings together the interests of the
partners.
SEPT. - Rapport de aussion - McDONALD'S contre V COLLORAFT - Mars 1994
McDONALD'S thus appears as the very example of the strategic company which
chooses to take its place in the long term. The logic of its franchise is clear: make
its partners succeed in order to ensure its own success
This logic finds its concrete transcription in the general economics of the McDONALD'S
franchise
• McDONALD'S finances land and premises, the franchisee buys only the equipment. The
system favours access to the franchise for dynamic entrepreneurs with limited
equity rather than for investors, unlike the approach of other
franchisors
• The fees are adapted while leaving an attractive remuneration to the
franchisee
• Franchisees who find themselves in difficulty can be financially supported
• Most of the risk is borne by McDONALD'S.
Technology
: r
2.1.2.1 An original supply system
McDONALD'S sells a service to franchisees. It neither produces nor sells food
to the restaurants, which place orders and source from
independent suppliers that they pay directly, unlike what many
chains do.
However, the characteristics and prices of the products are negotiated by
McDONALD'S, which allows franchisees to benefit from a quality supply
at the best cost, thanks to McDONALD'S's negotiating strength conferred on it by
the scale of its orders. The cost of the sourcing centre is
included in the 5% service fee.
The system is advantageous for both parties:
• the outsourcing of the manufacture of food and packaging guarantees the fairness
of McDONALD'S towards the franchisees: the company derives no margin on the
production of raw materials and therefore has only one interest - finding
suppliers with the best quality/price ratio. This case is uncommon in the case of
service franchising
Moreover, the system makes it easy to adapt to the specificities of the demand
of each country, by calling on national suppliers.
SEPT.
Rarcort de misson - MeDONALD'S conre U COLLORAFI - Mars 1998
• McDONALD'S thus avoids the costs that it would inevitably be obliged to invoice
to handle the collection of franchisees' orders, pass the orders to
suppliers and then manage the payments.
The combination of franchising and the outsourcing of production thus allows
McDONALD'S to devote itself to what makes its strength: advice and marketing (see
“Le système McDo”, in Alternatives Economiques, no. 151, September 1997, see annex
no. 2.1).
2.1.2.2 An active and constant policy of training, advice and assistance
Even before concluding an agreement, McDONALD'S begins by giving
candidates training that gives them the best chances of succeeding in
operating their future franchise. It is a complete and demanding training
lasting about a year. Candidates are trained in all positions, from simple
crew member to the head of an SME, so as to acquire in-depth knowledge,
both practical and theoretical, of how a McDONALD'S restaurant operates
By way of illustration, every activity, even the simplest, within the restaurant is
carefully studied and is the subject of a video cassette.
McDONALD'S then provides each franchisee with permanent and personalised advice and assistance to achieve this triptych: Quality, Service, Cleanliness, which explains the
success of fast food the McDONALD'S way. This training is
constant, both through practice in the field and through training courses
One only has to read the reports of the McDONALD'S teams visiting in the field to
gauge the professionalism and precision of their observations, which
enable
each franchisee to undertake all the actions likely
to optimise the operation of his restaurant.
2.1.2.3 A partnership-based commercial policy
The 4.5% fee on food turnover excl. VAT paid for advertising
by the franchisees is managed by themselves through a G.I.E. McDONALD'S, the
franchisor, has no more than one vote in this G.I.E.
2.1.2.4 Constant adaptation and renewal of the offer
McDONALD'S strives to react to changes in public taste, thanks to sustained
marketing, which enables it to stay ahead of competitors and to
prevent consumer fatigue
SEPT - Rapport de mission - MCDONALD'S conte M. COLLOKAF? - Mars 1908
i a
Its strategy comprises several axes:
• Enrich the product range and adapt it to national tastes (by way of example,
salads were introduced in French restaurants).
• Widen the range of opening hours by offering for example a breakfast (savoury or
sweet) called Mc Morning
• Offer seasonal products to attract consumers seduced by
novelty (Mc Marin for fish-based meals, etc.)
• Respond to consumers' ecological concerns (Corporate Environment
Plan signed with the Ministry of the Environment which provides in particular for
the use of recycled materials).
The permanent capacity for adaptation and renewal of its offer appears
as one of the keys to the durability of McDONALD'S's success in a market
marked by the rapid change in consumers' tastes and expectations and by
strong competition
THE GENERAL ECONOMICS OF THE McDONALD'S FRANCHISE
Thanks to the lease-management agreement, the franchisees' initial investment
is limited
The McDONALD'S franchise combines a licence agreement and a lease-
management agreement
This system leaves the creation of the business (fonds de commerce) to the
franchisor, making it possible to reduce the franchisees' initial investment, in such a
way that good franchise candidates are not prevented from joining the
McDONALD'S network for lack of sufficient personal equity
To gauge the importance of the share of the investment financed by
McDONALD'S at each restaurant opening, the franchise agreement
should be examined, which comprises
• A Licence agreement covering the grant of the McDONALD'S brand to the
franchisee, who pays in return a service fee of 5% of food turnover excl. VAT (see annex 2.2 Pre-contractual information document,
§2.1 p. 10 and §2.2 p. 11)
• A lease-management agreement under which McDONALD'S leases to the franchisee
the business, of which it remains the owner, and the premises, of which it is the owner
or the tenant
SEPT
Rapport de mission • MCDONALD N contre V COFORAF! Mars 1998
The business includes land and buildings in the case of the so-called
Straight License agreement (see annex 2.2: Pre-contractual information document, § 2.4
p. 10), or the property, land, building and equipment in the case of the so-called B.F.L. agreement (see
annex 2.2: Pre-contractual information document, § 2.4 p. 11).
To note that the franchisee has the option of extending a B.F.L. type agreement
(term of three years) by converting it into a so-called Straight License agreement (term of
twenty years) provided certain conditions are met (see annex 2.3
Lease-management agreement, art. XII p. 17 - p. 19)
On the financial plan, the company McDONALD'S is remunerated for the purchase or lease
of the land and the construction of the premises that it grants by lease-management (so-called
Straight License agreement) by a standard fee varying according to the amount of
the initial investment (see annex 2.2: Contractual information document § 3.1
p. 10) and which in fact corresponds to a rent that any franchisee in another network
would have to pay in any event.
When McDONALD'S also supplies the equipment by lease-management
(so-called B.F.L. agreement), it receives an equipment fee of 4.5% (see Annex Lease-management
agreement p. 4), but in that case the franchisee has practically no other
investment to make and consequently takes almost no risk
The amount of the standard fee cannot be lower than the minimum fee,
a provision intended to ensure a minimum return for McDONALD'S on the
investments it has financed. However, the minimum fee does not represent
an absolute guarantee of remuneration for McDONALD'S because of the
adjustments to fees that it grants to franchisees who find themselves in difficulty
(see below)
In all cases, whatever the form of agreement chosen, McDONALD'S therefore finances
most of the amount of the investment needed to open a restaurant
since it contributes at a minimum the land and premises. The franchisee's initial outlay
is reduced, opening access to the McDONALD'S network to all those whose contribution lies
only in their skill and motivation.
Thus on average McDONALD'S bears 2/3 of the overall investment,
against only 1/3 for the franchisee.
Moreover, the proportion of the overall amount of the investment provided by
McDONALD'S is higher for many sites, notably in coastal
tourist areas and city centres, because of the high price of land.
Lastly, McDONALD'S's investment can reach almost 100% in the case
of the so-called “B.F.L.” agreements, since it also includes the equipment.
J
NEY Rapport de mission - MeDONALD'S contre M. COLLORAFI Mars 1998
". i
By way of example, the sharing of investments between McDONALD'S and
the franchisees for the opening of nine restaurants in the south-east of France, including
the three restaurants of M COLLORAFI, should be cited
A quick calculation (amount of the investment made by McDONALD'S / total amount
of investments) shows that the relative importance of the investments
made by McDONALD'S for the opening of the restaurants cited as examples varies
between 67% and 97%, with 80% on average for the three restaurants of
M COLLORAFI
Date created
Nice Lingostière
McDONALD'S investment
70% of the total amount
Nice Promenade
McDONALD'S investment
78%
Vice INL
McDONALD'S investment
75%
Grasse
McDONALD'S investment
72%
Cannes les Allées
McDONALD'S investment
78%
Vallauris
McDONALD'S investment
76%
Antibes 1
(SEBOL, M COLLORAFT)
McDONALD'S investment
67%
Antibes Nord
(B&O M COLLORAFI
McDONALD'S investment
82%
Antibes Ouest
(LESPINS, M COLLORAFI)
McDONALD'S investment
97%
Average of M. COLLORAFI's restaurants*
80%
* This percentage is calculated as follows: cumulative amount of
McDONALD'S's investments in the three restaurants, including the
capitalisation of the initial rent in the case of a lease / cumulative amount of all
investments
It is to be noted that in the case of M COLLORAFI McDONALD'S's investments
were increasingly large at the opening of each new restaurant
up to 97% for the last one (Antibes Ouest), whereas usually the opposite occurs: the franchisee increases the share of investments borne by him
as he consolidates his financial base thanks to the income generated by
the operation of his first restaurants.
Rapport de mission . WeDONALD'S conte M. COLLORAFI - Hars 1998
2.2.2. Fees, but advantageous remuneration for the franchisees
The standard fee is calculated in a balanced way for the franchisee even though the
sharing of the investments is unequal, since McDONALD'S provides the greater part
of it (so-called Straight agreements), even almost all of it (so-called B.F.L. agreements)
In effect, McDONALD'S receives an adapted remuneration for the investments
it makes in order to create
the business (fonds de commerce). The objective pursued is the
development and prosperity of the network rather than short-term profits.
In this regard, M. COLLORAFI constitutes an excellent illustration of the high
remuneration enjoyed by McDONALD'S franchisees. Thus his
earnings between August 1987 and December 1996 (salary and dividends) amounted
on an annual average to 951,117 F
Return on McDonald's real-estate investment
for the Antibes restaurant
Investments at 15/12/1997
- 1real au badl
Buildings
Other (registration duties, etc.)
TOTAL
in KF
Depreciation
over 20 years, i.e. per year
Financing: 100% at 10C over 20 years (constant annuities)
Total over 10 years
Period 1988-1997
(1987 not counted because not a full year)
Total sales
Standard fee received (150 or 1250)
Rents (paid to Carrefour by McDonald's)
. Depreciation
L- financial expenses
Lessee margin
LEs (average gap 36,200)
Net (before overheads)
Source: McDonald's France, February 1998
in kF
fee
209 (H01
+942
++51
33,14%
5 170 21,101
Annual average
in kF
in % of invest-
ment
12.38% of total sales
19.10'%
194,20l
145,10
790,70|
577,021
5,557)
2,637
3wra
6,1+%
+ i
SEPT Kapport de messian - MOISONALD'S contre M. COLLORARI - Mars 1 098
Moreover, the existence of a minimum fee (see annex 2.3: Lease-management
agreement § IX 1.3) does not guarantee McDONALD'S an incompressible return on
the investments that it has made to constitute the business (fonds de commerce), insofar as
it grants fee adjustments to franchisees in difficulty
(see above).
Lastly, as the main investor, McDONALD'S would also be the main loser if a
restaurant had to close. It then risks recording a significant capital loss on
the sale of the business, of which it is the owner according to the very definition of the
lease-management agreement.
CONCLUSION
The McDONALD'S system can develop and endure only thanks to the franchise
network.
Consequently, to try to show that the interests of the franchisees and of the franchisor
diverge is to show a total misunderstanding of the general economics
of the McDONALD'S franchise, both in its legal foundation - the lease-management
agreement - and in its practical reality - the partnership - since the difficulties
of the franchisees have an immediate impact on the turnover of
McDONALD'S and compromise the viability of its investments.
Moreover, 43 years of uninterrupted success would not have rewarded such a
strategy
Lastly, McDONALD'S, as every franchisor must do under the code of
ethics of the Fédération Française de la Franchise, itself operates
a certain number of points of sale, called in its terminology restaurants.
At 11 December 1997, 70 restaurants in total were managed directly by
McDONALD'S, i.e. 11.1% of the 630 existing restaurants.
Rapport de mussion . McDONA/SS contre 1. COLLORAFT - Mars JY0R
orit
3rd Part
The case of Monsieur COLLORAFI
THE McDONALD'S RESTAURANTS MANAGED BY M. COLLORAFI
CHANGE AND CHARACTERISTICS
The history of events frames all the operations relating to this report over approximately 10 years.
On 5 August 1987 the first lease-management agreement for the
McDONALD'S restaurant of the Carrefour Shopping Centre in Antibes was granted to
M COLLORAFI and on 31 August 1987 this agreement was transferred to the Company SEBOL
controlled by M. COLLORAFI and his family.
The restaurant developed normally until 1994 with an expansion rate of
288% in the first year and then 42%, to reach an average rate of 109% each
year with a first slowdown between 1990 and 1991 (- 5.2%). Indeed, turnover
went from 21.184 M.F. in 1990 to 22.290 M F in 1991.
Likewise between 1993 and 1994 turnover underwent a slight decline (-1.66%)
since it went from 27,422,009 F to 26,965,840 F, the decrease representing 456,169 F,
i.e. 6 days of 1993 turnover
The opening of the QUICK DRIVE restaurant took place in July 1995 about 600 m from the
first McDONALD'S
SEBOL's turnover for 1995 fell by 9.6%, going from 27.3721 M F. in 1994 to 24.754 M.F
The QUICK DRIVE having opened in July, i.e. in the 7th month of operation, its impact
only partially affected SEBOL's turnover, especially as the ramping up of
a restaurant requires a certain time.
M COLLORAFI himself estimates the strength of the impact of this restaurant in his
letter of 17 April 1996 at between 15 and 25% (see annex 3.1)
SPi. Kapport de mission. MeDONALD'S conte M. COLLORAFT. Mars 1798
RESULTS FOR 1997 FOR THE 3 RESTAURANTS
In 1997, McDONALD'S's turnover figures for the three restaurants
in Antibes are explicit.
Indeed, whereas the year 1996 reached only turnover of 18,305,795 F - for
SEBOL alone - that of 1997 reaches 31,556,286 F for the three restaurants,
with a financial year of only 8 months for LES PINS
Indeed SEBOL reaches 11,054,691 F, Antibes Nord 13,491,418 F and Antibes Ouest
6,410,177 F, i.e. in total 31,556,286 F
OBSERVATIONS ON SITE
Your assignment led us to go on site on Wednesday 4 March 1998
We were able to visit the following restaurants:
• the 3 restaurants of M. COLLORAFI and the QUICK restaurant competing with the
McDONALD'S Antibes Nord;
the following McDONALD'S restaurants
• Vallauris
• Cagnes Plage
• Nice Masséna
• Nice Jean Médecin
Our findings were as follows:
3.3.1. Antibes Centre Commercial - SA SEBOL (see photos)
This “MALL” type restaurant is old. It offers 230 seats inside and 80 outside. There are nine tills at the counter. It is more than 10 years old and the decoration shows it. The state of cleanliness leaves something to be desired but this is probably due to the
current circumstances.
The restaurant is now outside the main flows of traffic. Indeed
until 1995 entrance no. 1, 50 m from the McDONALD'S, was the only entrance to the Shopping
Centre from the car park, which has about 500 spaces.
SAPI
• Rapport de mission
NODONALD'S conie M. COLORAFT. Mars 1998
Since 1995 more than 2,700 additional spaces have been created on the other side of the
roundabout. The main entrances (no. 2 and no. 3) are fed by these very large
car parks. The link between the two zones (the old and the new) is delicate: a
single narrow road. People present in or accessing the large car park cannot
see the McDONALD'S
Moreover there is no McDONALD'S advertising on site
This restaurant is currently marginalised both by its appearance and by its
location
Antibes Nord - SARL B & O (see photos)
This is a “FREE-STANDER-DRIVE” restaurant of medium size: 104 seats
inside and 150 outside, 3 floors with terrace. Five tills at the counter and
two tills for drive-through sales
This restaurant is very well placed on the roundabout of the route de Grasse and faces the
QUICK which, although larger, is less visible from the road
This restaurant came late, a year after the QUICK, but strategically
prevented the latter from developing, which we will prove in the analysis of
the impact
Antibes Ouest - SARL LES PINS (see photo)
This “FREE-STANDER-DRIVE” restaurant is the smallest of the three with
51) seats and 40 outside. Five tills at the counter and one for drive-through
sales
This restaurant is ahead of its market since the zone located towards the sea (at
350 m) is still under construction (several hundred dwellings), but it is placed
on a roundabout and access for cars is easy, which facilitates drive-through
sales
It achieved in 1997 turnover 34% higher than that of its twin, the
Vallauris restaurant operated by M. GILARSKI, opened the same day, 29 April
199?
NET! Kapport de mirson • MEDONALD'S conte M COLLORAF! Mars 1999
THE PARTICULAR CASE OF M. COLLORAFI
3.4.1. A comfortable situation
The result is plain.
For 10 years M. COLLORAFI paid himself substantial remuneration
His gross remuneration, declared benefits in kind included, reached between 1992 and 1996
52,083 FF per month.
To this remuneration must be added that of his wife, which reached in 1996 10,040 F
per month
The majority shareholder of the company SEBOL, M. COLLORAFI, moreover takes part of the profits arising from the company
the dividends paid reach
400,000 F in 1993
1,850,000 F in 1995
900,000 F in 1994
and 1,000,000 F in 1996
That is the equivalent of 154,100 F per month in 1995 and 83,333 F per month in 1996.
Now in 1996 precisely the company SEBOL showed the combined difficulties due to the
change in customer flows in the Shopping Centre and to the impact of the QUICK restaurant
opened in July 1995
The result of this financial year reaches only 352,000 F
Yet M COLLORAFI nonetheless paid himself remuneration of 625,000 F to which he
added that of his wife, 193,400 F, and dividends of 1,000,000 F
The total of M. COLLORAFI's withdrawals from the company SEBOL reaches in
+ T
1,000,000 FF
625,000 FF
193,400 FF
1,818,400 FF
Now, in February 1997, i.e. six months later, M COLLORAFI found himself
unable to finance the share falling to him in the creation of the restaurant
of ANTIBES LES PINS and asked his franchisor to substitute itself for him by
converting the “straight” agreement into a “B.F.L” agreement.
"АРУ
- Rapport de massan - MeDONA/!:S contre M. COLLOKAFI • Mars 1998
The following table summarises well the change in M. COLLORAFI's personal income over the years and his financial situation:
Year
Result
Yet
Franchisee
(a)
Wife
(2)
1987 over 5 months
198X
199+
19%6
/Total
Average over the first 10
Average over
(last
Average over 2
• 1 602 959
(h)
ib!
395!HKH
62? 145
625 0xMt!
1h)
192 330|
625 (HM)
193,490
+ 587 280| 5 043 669 1 002 268|
Equity
1 941806!
1 735+66
68? 280
Dividends
Total
income
1.30 (M)
270 (NH)
395 (мн)|
7X* 145
1200GEX
1 850 (00)
2 667 3.111
+ 150 000 10 195 937
+15 000;
625 735,
1 +25 000
Source: McDonald's France, February 1998
(a) Direct or indirect remuneration, excluding expenses relating to company vehicles
(b) Data not available
Average net result over the first 10 financial years
Share capital
i.e. a financial return of
183.5% per year
In total over 9 years and 5 months, M COLLORAFI's remuneration reached
an amount of
Remuneration
Payment of dividends
5,043,669 F
4,150,000 F
TOTAL
9,193,669 F
As the wife's remuneration is not all known, the amount of the latter's
remuneration over 7 years nevertheless reaches the total amount of
1,002,268 F, which in sound logic should be added.
Lastly, in the financial years 1995 and 1996 alone, Mr and Mrs COLLORAFI
paid themselves in salaries and dividends 4,185,820 F, i.e. 2,212,910 F per year.
J
SEPT Rapportde mission MCDONALD'Srende M COLLORAFT-Mars 1998
Recourse to the franchisor
Even while paying himself 1,000,000 F of dividends, M. COLLORAFI carried out on 28
January 1997 a particular operation. He borrowed 350,000 F over 3 years in the name of
SEBOL at the rate of 4.625% per year, which led him to reduce further the
financial means of the company SEBOL, while favouring his personal interests (see
annex 3.3)
Previously, moreover, M COLLORAFI had carried out similar operations. On
1 January 1990 he had borrowed from McDONALD'S in the name of SEBOL a sum of
415,283.35 FF over a period of 6 months. Yet in 1989 his results were already
profitable to the tune of 311,000 F. This agreement was moreover the extension of a
first loan of the same amount taken out with the franchisor on 14 December 1988
Moreover, on 15 April 1990, a second loan agreement was taken out in the amount of
336,417.41 F for a period of 12 months
3.4.3. A strategic error
3.4.3.1. The impact
Observation of the fast-food market shows that the impact of a new
restaurant, whether it bears the same brand or a different brand, depends
on several factors without any one of them dominating a priori, namely:
- proximity,
• the type of market,
• the type of restaurant.
- Proximity
Two restaurants spaced barely 300 m apart can quite well each achieve
significant turnover (+ more than 18 M F), as is the case in Nice with not
only two restaurants but with the three restaurants of Nice Masséna, Nice
Jean Médecin and Nice Promenade.
Sarr
Rapport de naisson
LEDONALD'5 rontre M. COLLORAFY Mars 109R
- The type of market
In Nice again, the market of the Nice Jean Médecin restaurant is that of a
run-down and working-class station district, undergoing reconversion. Opened in 1982 it achieved
turnover of 18,077,250 F in 1997
Nice Masséna, located 300 m further on along the same avenue towards place Masséna, is
on the contrary at the heart of the shopping district. Opened in 1986 its turnover
reached 23,886,436 F in 1997
Nice Promenade is aimed mainly at tourists. Opened in 1990 its turnover
reached 21,941,384 in 1997
Thus, these three restaurants each achieve turnover of more than 18 M F,
while the distance separating them is half that separating the
Antibes Nord and Antibes Centre Commercial restaurants.
- The type of restaurant
The strategy followed by McDONALD'S which, let us recall, enabled this group
to occupy 70% of a market of 11 billion francs in 10 years, rests on a
systematic occupation of large cities and then of medium-sized towns. The
types of restaurant are accordingly multiple.
Three types are distinguished
• The “mall” type
located in a shopping centre, its activity is tied to the
opening hours of the centre
• The “in-stores” type: this is a classic city restaurant with
on-site sales and takeaway sales.
• The “free-stander-drive”, located at a crossroads or on a road, this restaurant
offers motorists the possibility either of stopping or of ordering from their
vehicle
Regardless of their type, these restaurants can offer from 50 to 300 seats
not counting the terrace.
Thus in Antibes the Centre Commercial restaurant is of the “mall” type and
those of Antibes Nord and Antibes Ouest are “free-stander”
SANT
• Happort de mission . MEDONALD'S conre dr. COLLURAF vars 1998
3.4.3.2. The effects of the impact
The documents attached in annex (no. 3.2) show three impact studies in France on
three different towns: Le Mans, Cholet and Brive la Gaillarde.
For Cholet, the catchment area is 55,000 inhabitants and for Brive 64,000
inhabitants. Let us recall that Antibes has a catchment area of 75,000 inhabitants. These
areas are therefore quite comparable.
As for Le Mans, the catchment area is 189,000 inhabitants, but this case is
particular because it concerns openings of new restaurants very close to one
another.
Le Mans
1/ Created in 1992, restaurant no. 1 is “impacted” twice in the same year in
1993. The first time on 7 July by the creation of the Le Mans Centre restaurant (no. 2),
the second time on 4 December by the creation of Le Mans Nord (no. 3).
2: The total turnover of McDONALD'S in Le Mans in 1993 is
18,167,831 F but in 1993 it reaches 24,887,196 F, then in 1994, 35,529,588 F. In
two years, McDONALD'S's turnover practically doubled in the
Le Mans market
3! The impact on the turnover of restaurant no. 1 ceases in November 1994, i.e.
twelve months after the opening of restaurant no. 2
→ No. 2 is “impacted” only for three months by no. 3; indeed after three
months of falling turnover between September and December 1994, it resumes its
growth
5/ When the Le Mans “Bonne Table” restaurant (no. 4) is created on 10 September
1996, the three preceding restaurants are “impacted” but this impact stops
• for no. 1, nine months later in June 1997
• for no. 2, a year later in September 1997
• and for no. 3, on the same date, in September 1997
Thus, the impact lasts no more than a year and a half in the case of Le Mans
Cholet
For Cholet, restaurant no. 1 was created on 3 February 1993
SATI
¡upport de mission. MrDONALD'S contre 11. COLLORAM - Mars 1008
. i
The impact of restaurant no. 2 “Cholet la Louisière” created in March 1996 on
restaurant no. 1 ceases from April 1997, that is to say on the anniversary date one year
later.
Brive la Gaillarde
Restaurant no. 1 was created on 24 November 1993; the impact of Brive no. 2 “Malemort”,
created in August 1996, on the first restaurant also ceases in the 12th month, in August
These various elements underline repeatedly the particularity whereby
the impact of a new restaurant generally ceases one year after the opening of the competing
restaurant.
3.4.3.3 The study of the impacts in Antibes taking into account the QUICK restaurant
Restaurant
McDONALD'S ANTIBES
(S.151:B0L)
MCINALDS ANTIBES
NORD (SARIB&0)
QUICE AVTIBES
Turnover
Turnover
Evo-
Turnover
lulion! d'affaires
lution
Turnover
tution
8,639
183057051.25.700
3633°0)
I6 270 620
- 14.19%
Total
MCDOXALI, ANTIBES
CEST(SARI DES PINS)
Total with Antibes Ouest
26 965 84031 745 799 17,739 37 965 252| 19.59°C| 30 058 489|
2,88C4
6 +10 177
17.736 37065252| 19.50 +5 108 6(x
19.70%
frure: MeDonald's France, Février 1908 & IV.P 1
The Antibes Centre Commercial restaurant is first “impacted” at the end of July 1995
by the QUICK restaurant. This QUICK restaurant achieved over four months turnover
of 7,106,959 F in 1995*
*QUICK's turnover figures come from the INPI; QUICK closes its accounts at 30/09 and McDONALD'S
at 31/12. An adjustment had to be made.
QUICK's first financial year ends on 30.09.96 and has a total length of 14 months. For 1995, there are five months
between the end of July (opening date) and the end of December (McDONALD'S year-end): lacking detailed knowledge of the
monthly figures, we took 5/14ths of the financial year ended 30.09.96. For 1996, we added 9/14ths of
the financial year ended 30.09.96 and 3/12ths of the financial year ended 30.09.97. For 1997, we took as a basis
the turnover of the financial year ended 30.09.97. It must be higher than reality because the restaurant, as the
table shows, was also “impacted” by the Les Pins restaurant. We did not calculate the impact over
the last three months of 1997 and kept the 1996 figures for this same period
SEPT. Rappors de mession - MrDONALD'S conte M. COLLORAFI - Mars / 008
In 1996 QUICK achieves turnover of 16,270,620 F. Antibes Centre
Commercial 18,305,795 F and Antibes Nord, created opposite the QUICK on 9 October 1996,
achieves turnover of 3,388,837 F.
In 1997, in its turn, Antibes Nord, created in October 1996, “impacts” the QUICK restaurant
located opposite since the latter, instead of growing, falls from 16,270,620 F
to 13,912,380 F, i.e. by 14.49%. In fact, McDONALD'S achieves in total in this sector
25,146,109 F, i.e. approximately the 1994 figure, and moreover stopped the
growth of QUICK. In other words, thanks to Antibes Nord, McDONALD'S
erases the impact created by QUICK in 1995.
Lastly, if one adds the Antibes Ouest Les Pins restaurant, M COLLORAFI comes out
the winner of this struggle with a total turnover of 31,556,280 F, i.e. a gain of
17% on the turnover achieved in 1994.
This strategy enabled M. COLLORAFI
1. To progress in the Antibes market.
2. To prevent QUICK from establishing itself without real opposition and from developing
"APT
Rapport de misston . ArDONALD S contre M. COLLORAFI
Mars 1498
Glossary
McDONALD'S's reports use certain words of American origin. To make
reading easier, we have translated some of them:
BFL
Drive-in
Free-stander
Impacter
In-store
Mall
PAC
Straight License
Business Facility Licence: agreement under which McDONALD'S
also invests in the equipment
Drive-through restaurant.
These restaurants are in fact mixed, drive-through service and
traditional service.
Restaurant independent of any other building. Most are
equipped with a drive-through service.
Effect of the impact of the opening of one restaurant on another
Classic city restaurant.
Restaurant located in a shopping centre.
Restaurant managed by McDONALD'S.
Profit after controllable expenses calculated from an equation
adapted to the type of restaurant.
Agreement under which McDONALD'S invests in real estate and
construction. The franchisee invests in the equipment.
SEPT . Rappore de mission
MADONALD'S contre M. COLLORAFI - Mars 1908
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