The arrangement devised by Harry Sonneborn is the economic heart of the model. McDonald's does not merely sell a licence: the group takes the lease on the land and the building — or buys them — then sublets them to the franchisee, at a margin. The franchisee therefore pays two separate flows: a fee on its turnover, and rent.
The consequence is structural. The franchisor collects rent whether the restaurant does well or badly; and it holds the asset — the site — which the franchisee does not own. At the end of the agreement, the operator leaves without the premises.
There is nothing clandestine about this arrangement: McDonald's openly acknowledges it in its annual reports filed with the SEC, where the line for rental income appears in black and white, separate from fees. It is precisely this duplication — fees plus rent — that the Antibes case file finds in the accounts of a French franchisee in the 1990s.