The termination clause is a contractual weapon. It spares the creditor from asking the judge to terminate the contract: termination operates automatically, and the judge seised merely records that it has taken effect. He does not weigh the seriousness of the breach; he checks that it occurred.
The counterweight lies elsewhere: in the requirement of good faith. The first civil chamber laid this down on 31 January 1995 (no. 92-20.654): “a termination clause does not take effect if it has been implemented in bad faith by the creditor”. This counterweight is narrow. The third civil chamber held on 2 December 1998 (no. 97-11.109) that the implementation is assessed in the light of the order itself: the clause cannot be set aside by invoking grievances unrelated to the non-performance in question.
It is precisely on this knife-edge that the Collorafi case was played out. The Paris Court of Appeal held on 8 March 2000 that the orders to pay had been served in bad faith, and that the termination was therefore wrongful — without, however, releasing the franchisee from paying the fees due.